In Crypto 1997, Goldreich, Goldwasser and Halevi (GGH) proposed a lattice analogue of McEliece public key cryptosystem, in which security is related to the hardness of approximating the Closest Vector Problem in a lattice. Furthermore, they also described how to use the same principle of their encryption scheme to provide a signature scheme. Practically, this cryptosystem uses the Euclidean norm, l 2 -norm, which has been used in many algorithms based on lattice theory. Nonetheless, many drawbacks have been studied and these could lead to cryptanalysis of the scheme. In this article, we present a novel method of reducing a vector under the l -norm and propose a digital signature scheme based on it. Our scheme takes advantage of the l -norm to increase the resistance of the GGH scheme and to decrease the signature length. Furthermore, after some other improvements, we obtain a very efficient signature scheme, that trades the security level, speed and space.
Introduction
After the seminal work by Ajtai and Dwork (1997) and the first lattice-based cryptosystem from Goldreich, Goldwasser and Halevi (1997) , many cryptosystems based on lattice theory have been proposed. These systems use the Shortest Vector Problem (SVP) or the Closest Vector Problem (CVP) as their underlying hard problem to construct the trapdoor functions. For a recent survey on the SVP based cryptosystem, we refer the readers to Regev (2006) . l -norm The infinity norm In Crypto 1997, Goldreich, Goldwasser and Halevi (GGH) proposed a cryptosystem based on the lattice theory (Goldreich, Goldwasser and Halevi, 1997) , which is a lattice analogue of McEliece cryptosystem (1978) . The security of GGH is related to the hardness of approximating the CVP in a lattice. Furthermore, they also noted that using the underlying principle of their encryption scheme, a signature scheme can be constructed. Nonetheless, the resulting signature scheme did not attract much interest in the research community until a relatively efficient signature scheme called the NTRUSign was proposed (Hoffstein et al., 2003) . The GGH signature system can be described using three algorithms:
Setup: Compute a 'good basis' G and a 'bad basis' B of a lattice . (G) = (B). Provide B as public and keep G secret.
Sign: Use the good basis to have an efficient approximation of the closest vector of a vector. The initial vector is the message and the approximation is the signature. GGH uses the first Babai's method (1986) Verify: Check if the approximation is in the lattice of basis (B):
? n x , such that s = xB. The vector-signature should be also a good approximation of the vectormessage.
The important points for the security and efficiency of this cryptosystem are defined as follows.
1 It is easy to compute a 'bad basis' from a 'good basis', but it is difficult to compute a 'good basis' from a 'bad basis'.
2 It is easy to compute a good approximation of CVP with a 'good basis', but difficult to do so with a 'bad basis'.
3 It is easy to check the inclusion of a vector in a lattice even with a 'bad basis'. Nguyen (1999) proposed the first attack against the GGH cryptosystem. This attack is based on the utilisation by GGH of a non-singular matrix with a small norm for a good basis to use Babai's method. Due to this attack, the utilisation of GGH requires a lattice with big dimension (>500), to ensure its security. Nonetheless, the computation of the Babai's approximation becomes very expensive. Micciancio (2001) proposed some major improvements of the speed and the security of GGH. In this scheme, the public key uses the Hermite Normal Form (HNF) basis for the 'bad basis'. The HNF basis is better to answer the inclusion question and it also seems to be more difficult to transform to a 'good basis' compared to another basis. For the signature scheme, Micciancio used the reduced-vector instead of a closest vector. The reduced vector is in fact the difference between a vector and its closest vector. Using this method, the length of the signature is shorter. Gentry and Szydlo (2002) found a problem in GGH signature scheme which seems to be not zero-knowledge. Szydlo (2003) gave an algorithm to elaborate this problem further. This method uses several vector-signatures given by the Babai's method to attack GGH. However, this method seems to be not very efficient. NTRUSign (Hoffstein et al., 2003) was created based on a very similar method to GGH but with most improvements on the utilisation of NTRU basis (Hoffstein, Pipher and Silverman, 1998) for the 'good basis'. Those basis seem to be more resistant against the previously known attacks. Nevertheless, Nguyen and Regev (2006) proposed a general attack against both GGH signature scheme and NTRUSign. This clever attack used the large CVP approximations naturally given by the signature of messages to design the fundamental parallelepiped of the 'good basis'. Regev (2006) provided an invited talk at Crypto 2006 on the progress of lattice-based cryptography. At the end of his paper, Regev questioned whether one could construct signature schemes from lattices that do not suffer from the known problem in the literature.
Our results. In this article, we use the l -norm instead of the l 2 -norm to construct a digital signature scheme which is similar with GGH signature scheme. By using the lnorm, we aim to increase the security of the resulting cryptosystems, together with its efficiency in terms of signature length and computation time.
Paper organisation. This article is organised as follows. We start the article by providing some preliminary work and knowledge on lattice theory for cryptography. Then, we proceed with the eigenvalue theory and other useful definitions used throughout this article. Then, we present the main part of the work, which is the reduction vector in l -norm and the related theorems, followed by a signature scheme and its further improvements. Finally, we conclude the article by comparing our scheme with the GGH signature scheme.
Lattice theory for cryptography
In this section, we will review some basic concepts of the lattice theory, and in particular addressing the NPhardness of the trapdoor problems used. For a more complex account, we refer the readers to Nguyen and Stern (2001) .
Notations
Throughout the article, we denote a matrix by an uppercase bold letter, i.e. B, and its ith row and jth column entry by an uppercase plain letter with a subscript, i.e. B i, j . We denote a vector by a lowercase bold letter, i.e. b, and its ith entry by a lowercase plain letter with a subscript, i.e. b i . A single (real/integer) number is denoted by a lowercase plain letter, i.e. b.
For completeness, we provide a list of acronyms and definitions that will be used throughout this article in Table 1 .
Lattice theory
The lattice theory, also known as the geometry of numbers, was introduced by Minkowski (1896) . The complete discussion on the basic of lattice theory can be found from Cassels (1959) , Lovász (1986) and Conway and Sloane (1988) . 
Definition 1 (Lattice

Remark 1.
There also exists a definition of the determinant for a non-full-rank lattice. However, in this article, we only focus on the basic of lattice theory that is required throughout the article. Since we only deal with full-rank integer lattice, consequently with a basis , n n B , therefore, we simplify the definition as above.
For a given lattice , there exists an infinity of basis. However, the HNF basis (Definition 4) is unique (Cohen, 1993) . 
Definition 4 (HNF
The HNF basis can be computed from a given basis in a polynomial time (Kannan and Bachem, 1979) . For efficient solutions, we refer the readers to Micciancio and Warinschi (2001) .
Remark 2. The HNF basis is a 'good basis' for solving the problem of inclusion of a vector in a lattice (Cohen, 1993) .
As it was successfully used by Micciancio (2001) , we will also incorporate it in this article with some further improvements. Many algorithmic problems of the lattice theory are built upon two other problems which are clearly more difficult, namely, the SVP and the CVP.
Definition 5 (SVP).
Let B be a given basis of a lattice . The SVP is to find a vector u 0 such that \{ }, v 0 u v for a given norm . .
Definition 6 (CVP).
Let B be a given basis of a lattice and w a target vector. The CVP is to find a vector u such that , v w u w v for a given norm . . CVP is NP-hard for all norms l p (Definition 7) including l -norm Boas (1981) .
Definition 7 (l p -norm). Let w be a vector of
n . The l p -norm is the function
The l 2 -norm is also known as the Euclidean norm. The l -norm, also known as the infinity norm, is computed as
The l 2 and l norms have been studied and used in the lattice theory. The NP-hardness of the two problems for these two norms has been proven. In 1981, Emde Boas proved the NP-hardness of CVP , SVP and CVP 2 in Boas (1981) . Subsequently, Ajtai (1998) proved the NPhardness of SVP 2 . Consequently, there exist only some exponential algorithms to completely solve those problems. We summarise this result in Table 2 . However, some approximation versions of these two problems exist in the literature.
Table 2
Exponential algorithms for Shortest Vector Problem and Closest Vector Problem Kannan (1983) , Helfrich (1985) and Hanrot and Stehle (2007) Kannan (1983) , Helfrich (1985) and Hanrot and Stehle (2007) (2 (1/ )) d Ajtai, Kumar and Sivakumar (2002) and Blömer and Naewe (2007) (Dinur, Kindler and Safra, 1998) 1/ log log d d (Dinur, 2000) 1/ log log d d (Dinur, 2000) Not NPhard / log d d (Goldreich and Goldwasser, 1998) / log d d (Goldreich and Goldwasser, 1998) / log d d (Goldreich and Goldwasser, 1998) / log d d (Goldreich and Goldwasser, 1998) Definition 8. AppSVP (resp. AppCVP) Let B be a given basis of a lattice , w a vector and a real 1. The AppSVP (resp. AppCVP) is to find a vector u such that , v u v (resp. w u w v ) for a given norm . .
The NP-hardness of these two approximation problems has also been well-studied (for more detail, see Cai, 1999 or more recently Peikert, 2007) . Table 3 summarises some main results on the NP-hardness of these two approximation problems for the Euclidean and the infinity norms for the approximation factor in function of the dimension d of the studied lattice. Goldreich et al. (1999) proved that SVP is not harder than CVP.
Remark 3. Table 3 seems to show that the approximation problems seem to be more difficult for the l -norm compared to the l 2 -norm. This impression is supported by a recent paper by Khot (2003) which presented a result that proved that SVP will be more and more difficult in l p if p grows. A more recent paper of Regev and Rosen (2006) proved that a lot of classic problems, including SVP and CVP, are easier under the l 2 -norm than under every other l p -norm, including l -norm.
Remark 3 is supported by the fact that most of the polynomial and efficient algorithm to approximate SVP and CVP are for the l 2 -norm.
For SVP, Lenstra, Lenstra and Lovasz (1982) proposed a powerful polynomial algorithm, known as the Lenstra, Lenstra and Lovasz (LLL) algorithm, to efficiently approximate SVP and more generally the length of the basis itself. This algorithm approximate SVP for the l 2 -norm within an approximation factor = 2 (d 1)/2 in theory, but seems to be much more efficient in practice (Nguyen and Stehlé, 2006) . In addition, a lot of improvements have been proposed on LLL to obtain a better approximation factor and/or a better time complexity. For the recent result on LLL, refer to Nguyen and Stehlé (2005) and Schnorr (2006) . Combining this approach with the Block Korkin-Zolotarev (BKZ) method (Schnorr, 1987 (Schnorr, , 1988 , which can be seen as a generalisation of LLL, is a very powerful way to attack a cryptosystem-based or linked to SVP 2 .
For CVP, Babai (1986) proposed two polynomial methods. Those algorithms approximate CVP for the l 2 -norm within a factor = 1 + 2d(9/2) d/2 and = 2 d/2 , respectively. Babai's algorithms use an LLL-reduced basis. Consequently all the variants of LLL, including BKZ utilisation proposed by Schnorr (1996) , are naturally the improvement of Babai's methods. Moreover, there exists an heuristic way to directly approximate CVP using an approximate algorithm for SVP Nguyen (1999) . See Agrell et al. (2002) for a general survey of AppCVP.
All the existing algorithms have been created for the Euclidean norm. Nevertheless, the l 2 -norm algorithm can be used to approximate SVP and CVP for the l -norm using the equivalence of norms, (Golub and Loan, 1983) . The final approximation for l will be clearly worst than for l 2 and this method cannot be used to solve exactly the SVP and CVP under l .
Remark 4. In this article, we aim to construct a latticebased cryptosystem which is more resistant than the existing ones in the literature using the l -norm. A recent work by Chen and Meng (2006) clearly went this way. They proved the NP-hardness of the CVP with preprocessing over l -norm. Regev and Rosen (2006) gave the factor of 1/2 log d for the NP-hardness of CVP with preprocessing under l p -norm, 2 p .
Basic definitions
In this section, we briefly review some definitions of the eigenvalue theory that will be required throughout this article. Most of the following definitions and properties can been found in Householder (1964) , Wilkinson (1965) and Collatz (1966) . In the following definitions, let n . If h is an eigenvector then for any real number 0, h is also an eigenvector. A matrix composed by n eigenvectors of n eigenvalues is an eigenmatrix. There is an infinity of eigenmatrix. We specially focus on the eigenmatrix H which minimises the condition number (Definition 12) of the infinity norm. In fact, the spectral radius can be seen as the lower bound of all the matrix norm of a matrix: ( ) = inf{ } A A . The spectral radius has some useful properties as follows.
Definition 9 (Matrix Norm
Definition 12 (Condition Number
Theorem 2. For any matrix norm . and any square
Using this property, we can obtain the following property. See Wilkinson (1965) for the proofs of Theorems 1-3.
The last property of the spectral radius that will be used in this article is provided in Theorem 4.
Theorem 4. For any square matrix A and any real number > 0, there exists a polytope norm . P such that ( ) .
P A A
The proof of Theorem 4 is given in Householder (1964) by providing a way to compute the matrix P. In fact, there exists an infinity of such matrix P connected by a multiplication by a non-singular diagonal matrix. If the eigenvalues are distinct, we can use an eigenmatrix for P.
Here, we focus on the matrix P that minimises ( ) P .
Vector reduction in l -norm
In this section, we propose a new method of vector reduction using a modification of the Babai's method. This new algorithm uses another definition of a 'good basis' to obtain an approximation of CVP . To approximate the closest vector w of a vector v, Babai used the approximation given by the equation 1 = u vG G . As explained previously, this approximation has two major problems when it is used in cryptography, namely, an expensive computation and a mark of the 'good basis' on the approximate vector. To solve these two problems, we propose a new approximation of the vector v. This approximation is inspired by the work of Bajard, Imbert and Plantard (2004) which proposed a method to reduce some number representation for modular arithmetic. The method used in this article can be seen as a generalisation of their technique. An important point is the conservation of the efficiency which is the main feature in modular arithmetic operations.
Our focus is on the reduced vector, v mod , and not on the closest vector. We note that these two problems are completely equivalent. The reduced vector w is equal to the difference between a vector v and its closest vector u. So to reduce a vector, the Babai method becomes 1 = w v vG G. We decompose G into two matrices:
We will see that the choice of D and M determine if G is a 'good basis' or not. We use this decomposition to approximate v.
We assume that D is non-singular, so we are able to compute D 
.
w v v MD D G v vD MD G
We modify the Babai's approximation to a new approximation. Varga (1962) and Krasnosel'Skii et al. (1972) for more detail on this theory.
However, even if this theory is very similar, it does not solve the question of Algorithm 1 termination. Therefore, we propose Theorem 5 which is inspired by such a theory to answer this question. To finish this proof, we have to adapt this result to different norm. 
MD P MD
then Algorithm 1 ends. We note that this proof is very similar and inspired by some proofs found in Krasnosel'Skii et al. (1972) to solve close problem of successive approximation convergence.
Corollary 1
The proof of Theorem 5 also gives the number of loops needed to end Algorithm 1. If all the parameters are polynomial in n, then we will have a O(log (n)) number of loops. In such condition, we obtain O(n 2 log (n)) for the time complexity of Algorithm 1.
Remark 6. Theorem 5 clearly provides some conditions to terminate Algorithm 1. These three conditions are complementary.
1 The l p -norm can be used to have a fast approximation. See Higham (1992) for some methods to compute l p norm for a matrix if p is not simple = 1,2, ,
The polytope norm provides a way to be closer to
which is the lower bound. But, its computation can be long to minimise ( ) P .
3 The non-singular eigenmatrix are the best evaluation but it requires us to have distinct eigenvalues, which we do not always have.
In fact, after several practical tests and theoretical analysis, we are able to make a conjecture. 
Signature scheme
Scheme
In this section, we describe our new signature scheme, which comprises of the three algorithms: Setup, Sign and Verify. are arbitrary and they can be changed.
However, these choices seem to be practically reasonable.
Verify. To verify a message-signature pair, (m, w), one does the following. 
Improvements
In this section, we present some improvements to our scheme to make it practical. These improvements provide some choices to the main algorithm, in order to optimise it during the implementation of the algorithm.
Signature
The main part of the signing algorithm is in the reduction part as defined in Algorithm 1. The fact that D is a diagonal matrix will simplify a lot of computations of wD be a power of two. This choice transforms the division corresponding to the first two lines of the loop to a shift operation. Hence, the reduction of a vector can be summarised to shift and addition operations, assuming that the matrix has low coefficients.
Verification
The main part of the verification algorithm is the time to verify the inclusion of w in the lattice . As we described in Remark 2, the utilisation of the HNF accelerates this computation and it was successfully used in Micciancio (2001 With this setting, we can propose a very simple algorithm to verify the signature as follows.
Remark 9. Optimal HNF simplifies the verification method and also minimises the size of the public key. We note that in this case, we only need to send the first column of the matrix H. Consequently, we will use the optimal HNF for a 'bad basis'.
Comparison with Goldreich, Goldwasser and Halevi signature
The advantage that our system has compared to the GGH signature scheme is the use of the l -norm, which will make the scheme more resistant and difficult to attack. Furthermore, a shorter signature length and an efficient computation to compute with Algorithm 1 can be achieved with the help of fast arithmetic operations. The details of these advantages are provided in this section.
Resistance
An approximation of CVP also provides an approximation of CVP 2 by the equivalence of norm. Theoretically, the complexity of our cryptosystem cannot be less than the initial GGH signature scheme and Micciancio's improvements. However, parameter choices are essential to achieve a practical high resistance scheme.
The best basic way to attack our scheme is by finding . This brute force attack is faster than solving exactly a CVP using Kannan's method (Kannan, 1983) , which has the complexity of ( ) O n n . Note that these two possible attacks are in the exponential order. When n is chosen to be large, then these techniques cannot be employed. Therefore, in order to attack it, only an approximation of CVP that can be computed, rather than solving it. Although the approximation of CVP is polynomial, the attack is a heuristic attack and therefore, there is no assurance that the result is precise enough.
A theoretical timing attack is also possible as the time of the signature depends upon the message-vector. However, such an attack seems very unlikely: to obtain information on the form of message vector if its reduction took 4 or 5 loops instead of 6 seems very hard. There exist a simple way to completely prevent this hypothetical attack. A simple improvement of Algorithm 2 is the utilisation of a random initialisation of : rand(0, , 1) i i n instead of a classic 0 i . Besides the fact that there is no real reason to begin with 0, this improvement will provide two advantages. First, temporary approximation vectors are not the same between two reductions of the same vector: that will change the number of loops to reduce to the same vector. This property gives an advantage against side-channel attacks, like timing attack. The most important advantage is that this method grows the length of the set of vectors of { , } D v v that can be returned. This property provides a strong resistance against the attack described in Nguyen and Regev (2006 To finalise the comments on the security, we need to comment our scheme against the most successful attack against GGH signature scheme and NTRUSign. Nguyen and Regev (2006) proposed a clever way to design the fundamental parallelepiped using some signature-message which represent a CVP approximation. We also note that this attack will be ineffective against our system. All the signature-message are in { . Finding the design of this volume is not particularly useful since D is already given as a public parameter. In Figure 1 , we present an example of some signature-message on 2 after reduction with Babai's method or with our method. Even if the dimension 2 is far away of cryptographic dimension, we can still see the mark used by Nguyen and Regev (2006) . In fact, we see that the vectors of the basis can be designed after enough Babai reductions, but that we can only design D after reduction by Algorithm 2. 
Speed
For an optimised version of the signature scheme (Algorithm 2), Algorithm 1 uses only shift and addition operations. However, we need to know the average number of loops to reduce a signature vector. Even if the proof of Theorem 5 give us a bound on the worst case, the average case seems to be difficult to evaluate. In Figure 2 , we present an average number of iterations from Algorithm 2. On every dimension 
M
. Figure 2 shows the average of the number of loops required to reduce a message vector to a signature vector.
From Figure 2 , one can conclude that on average, the number of loops required for signing is between 5 and 7 to achieve a good security level, which is approximately began from 200. Furthermore, Figure 2 confirms that the average number of loops are logarithmic on n, (log ) O n .
We note that our reduction is applicable only for some special lattices. Nevertheless, the resulting efficiency obtained from these lattices are very interesting to develop efficient and fast digital signature schemes. As explained earlier, a loop can be minimised to only shift and addition operations. It provides us with a very competitive way to reduce a vector when the first Babai's reduction uses two matrix multiplications. The first matrix multiplication in Babai's reduction is the most expensive operation, since it requires a high precision on a floating point matrix multiplication. In contrast to Babai's method, our method can be used in a huge dimension that will provide higher level of security without any time constraint.
Space
In this section, we provide some evaluation on the signature space. l -norm is naturally the norm used to evaluate the space complexity of a signature. The fact that Algorithm 1 deals directly with this norm makes an important difference with Babai's method. Figure 3 shows result of test on the l -norm of reduce vector. We present three curves corresponding to three parameters. For every dimension n ( [50, 350 ] n ), we compute on 100 random matrices chosen in The important point of this result is that we can observe that the l norm of a reduced vector with this type of basis is in ( ) O n after Babai's reduction and in ( ) O n after our reduction. This difference clearly comes from the difference between 2 l and l -norm. To obtain a theoretical limit of this result, we use the result of German (1986) which evaluates the limit when the dimension n grow of the spectral radius of a random This limit provides a good approximation of the spectral radius of a random matrix. Using this limit, we obtain the following result for a random matrix M taken in . The theoretical approximation of ( ) M and D obtained using German's theorem is very close to our own practical test given in Figure 3 .
Conclusion and open problem
In this article, we presented a new method of vector reduction under the l -norm. Then, we constructed a signature scheme based on this norm. The resulting scheme seems very interesting, in terms of security, length and speed. We conclude this article by providing an open research problem: how to prove Conjecture 1 of < (1/ 2) .
